Real Product Origin.

Why It Matters

Why product-origin transparency matters

A grounded case, in four parts. Sources listed at the bottom.

Every purchase you make online is, quietly, a vote — for a product, a supply chain, and the polity behind it. Right now the ballot is often written in invisible ink. This page is our attempt to explain why the ink should be legible, without hyperbole and with the receipts.

Real Product Origin exists because four separate problems have quietly converged on large online marketplaces: a quality problem, an authenticity problem, a structural problem, and a choice problem. None of these are speculation. Each is documented by economists, policy institutes, or the platforms themselves. What follows is our short summary of what the evidence actually says — and why we think a browser badge that answers four simple questions before you buy is a reasonable response to it. Each section shows a concise summary by default; open the "Read the case in full" panel for the long-form argument and cited sources.


Part 1 · Quality

1. Avoid unknowingly buying things that fall apart

A generation ago, "Made in X" was information printed on the box. Online, most of that context disappears. U.S. regulators went from three unilateral CPSC safety warnings in 2020 to sixty-four in 2024 — and over 95% were on goods sold online. Opacity, not any single country, is the risk factor we want to make visible.

Read the case in full

A generation ago, "Made in X" was information you could see on the box before you paid. Online, most of that context evaporates. On a typical online listing you see a brand name, a photo, star ratings, and a price. The Country of Origin field is present maybe half the time; the seller's actual country of registration is buried in a separate page most shoppers never open.

Consumer-safety regulators are increasingly candid about what happens next. The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission issued three unilateral product-safety warnings in 2020 — the ones it publishes when a manufacturer won't cooperate with a recall. In 2024 it issued 64. Of those 64, 42 involved products manufactured in China, and 61 — over 95% — were sold online.1 This is not a claim about any one country's factories. It is a claim about a specific commerce pattern: goods that arrive with minimum inspection, from sellers with minimum accountability, through platforms that are legally not the seller of record.

The CPSC's own guidance notes that the de minimis loophole — under which parcels below a low customs threshold enter the country with almost no inspection — grew from roughly 150 million shipments a year in 2015 to over one billion a decade later.1 That is the pipe through which most drop-shipped generic goods arrive. Knowing whether a listing rides that pipe or whether it's stocked in a domestic warehouse from a brand with a return address is not paranoia. It is the same signal your grandmother read off the tag on a toaster.

None of this means a product manufactured overseas is bad, or that a product made domestically is good. It means opacity is the risk factor. A listing where every origin signal is visible and consistent behaves very differently, statistically, from a listing where every origin signal is missing or contradicted. We surface both.

CPSC unilateral safety warnings, 2020 to 2024 A bar chart showing three unilateral CPSC warnings in 2020 and sixty-four in 2024. 3 2020 64 2024
Over 20×. Unilateral CPSC safety warnings issued when a manufacturer would not cooperate with a recall. Source: Consumer Federation of America analysis of 2024 CPSC data.1

Part 2 · Authenticity

2. Avoid unknowingly buying things that aren't what they say

Global counterfeit trade totalled roughly USD 464-467 billion in 2019-2021 — about 2.3% of world imports. Counterfeits are only the sharp edge of a wider problem: shell-brand names, false heritage stories, and paper US trademarks stapled to entirely overseas production. It all hinges on shoppers not being able to see who is really behind a brand.

Read the case in full

The counterfeit problem online is not a rounding error and it is not shrinking. The OECD and the EU Intellectual Property Office estimated the global trade in counterfeit and pirated goods at USD 464 billion in 2019, rising to USD 467 billion in their 2021 dataset — roughly 2.3% of world imports.2 A 2016 report commissioned by the International Trademark Association projected the global counterfeit-and-piracy total could reach USD 2.8 trillion by 2022 once the digital and services share is included.3 Those are macro numbers; the micro version is a listing on your screen right now that describes itself as something it isn't.

Amazon publishes its own account of the same problem. In 2023 the company said it invested USD 1.2 billion and employed more than 15,000 people on brand protection; it identified and destroyed 7 million counterfeit units and blocked more than 700,000 attempts to open bad-actor selling accounts.4 Amazon is putting real resources against the problem. But the raw numbers also tell you the base rate: the store defends itself against seven-figure counterfeit attempts every year, and no defence is perfect.

Counterfeiting is only the sharp end of a wider authenticity problem. The subtler cases are misrepresentation: a US-sounding brand name registered as a shell entity, then licensed to unbranded overseas contractors; a "Swiss" or "Italian" heritage story attached to a product with no substantive connection to either country; a Delaware LLC filing a US trademark for goods that are designed, manufactured, warehoused, and monetised entirely elsewhere. These are not counterfeits in the trademark-law sense. They are what happens when a shopper cannot see who is really behind a brand — and they are exactly the kind of pattern our four-indicator score is built to expose. When the retailer country and the "money goes to" country disagree, we say so.

Global counterfeit and pirated goods trade, 2021 A stylised iceberg diagram: a small labelled visible tip above the waterline; a much larger mass beneath representing the counterfeit-and-misrepresented share. visible below the line what the listing tells you $467B counterfeit trade, 2021
~2.3% of world imports. Global trade in counterfeit and pirated goods, 2021. Source: OECD / EUIPO, Global Trade in Fakes.2

Part 3 · Structural

3. The structural problem: why any of this matters at scale

The Autor–Dorn–Hanson "China Shock" research found rising Chinese import competition explained roughly a quarter of the U.S. manufacturing-employment decline from 1990 to 2007, with the effects still measurable two decades on. Layered on top is Made in China 2025 — a documented, state-directed industrial strategy that treats subsidised exports as a policy instrument. This is a critique of a policy, not of a people.

Read the case in full

This is the longest section on the page because the case takes real evidence to make. We want to make it carefully.

The clearest empirical work is a body of research by David Autor (MIT), David Dorn (Zurich), and Gordon Hanson (Harvard), commonly called the China Shock literature. Their 2013 paper in the American Economic Review found that rising Chinese import competition between 1990 and 2007 explained roughly a quarter of the total decline in U.S. manufacturing employment over that period, and that local labour markets exposed to that competition saw higher unemployment, lower participation, and reduced wages.5 Their 2016 review in the Annual Review of Economics found that "adjustment in local labour markets is remarkably slow" — a full decade after the shock, wages and participation in affected communities remained depressed.6 Their 2021 retrospective, published as an NBER working paper and in the Brookings Papers, extended the analysis to 2019 and found the adverse effects were still measurable nearly two decades on.7

None of these authors are polemicists. They are empirical economists whose conclusions ran ahead of a policy debate that has since caught up with them. The finding is not that trade is bad. The finding is that a specific pattern — subsidised, state-directed export saturation into open markets with no reciprocal access — imposes concentrated, durable costs on the receiving economy that the standard trade textbook underestimated.

What makes this a structural problem and not just an economic one is the policy behind it. The Chinese government's Made in China 2025 initiative, published in 2015, explicitly targeted ten strategic sectors — advanced information technology, robotics, aerospace, maritime equipment, rail, new-energy vehicles, power equipment, agricultural equipment, new materials, and biopharma — for state-supported dominance of global market share.8 CSIS, the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, and multiple independent trackers have documented substantial progress against those targets in the decade since.8 The 2018 U.S. Trade Representative Section 301 investigation, and its November 2018 update, laid out in detail how forced technology transfer, discriminatory licensing, state-directed acquisition of foreign firms, and cyber-enabled trade-secret theft fit together as instruments of the same industrial strategy.9 The IP Commission Report of 2017, a bipartisan effort chaired by former U.S. officials, put the annual cost of IP theft to the U.S. economy at somewhere between USD 225 billion and USD 600 billion.10

Robert Spalding, a retired U.S. Air Force brigadier general and former senior defence official at the U.S. embassy in Beijing, made a related argument in book form in Stealth War (2019) and War Without Rules (2022). His thesis, in brief, is that China's economic expansion is best understood not as ordinary market competition but as a coordinated national strategy that treats economics, technology, education, and information as continuous with strategic power.11 A reader can accept the empirical premises of that argument without endorsing every prescription that follows from it.

How we frame this. The Chinese people are not the subject of this critique. Neither is Chinese manufacturing skill, which is often excellent. The subject is a policy — a specific, documented, state-directed industrial strategy that uses subsidised exports as an instrument. Ordinary workers in Chinese factories are, on any honest reading, closer to the tool than to the beneficiary. The people this strategy needs to keep working are unwitting foreign consumers who cannot see, at the moment of purchase, whose supply chain they are underwriting. Making that visible is not hostility. It is symmetry.

Made in China 2025 — ten targeted sectors A 5-by-2 grid of ten labelled dots representing the ten strategic sectors named in the Made in China 2025 initiative. IT Robotics Aerospace Maritime Rail New-energyvehicles Powerequipment Ag.equipment Newmaterials Biopharma Ten sectors targeted for state-supported dominance
Made in China 2025. The ten strategic sectors named in the 2015 policy for state-supported dominance of global market share. Source: CSIS analysis of the MIC 2025 policy.8

Part 4 · Choice

4. Every purchase is a vote you didn't know you were casting

You have preferences about the world. Perhaps you'd rather not fund a supply chain with documented forced-labour risk; perhaps you'd rather buy from a small domestic manufacturer; perhaps on any given day you just want a cheap dress. All those choices are legitimate — but only if you can see what you're choosing between. Country-of-origin transparency is not radical; it's a normal shelf label extended to the online store.

Read the case in full

The fourth reason is the simplest and, we suspect, the one most shoppers already feel without articulating.

You have preferences about the world. Perhaps you prefer not to fund a supply chain with a documented pattern of Uyghur forced labour — the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's 2020 report Uyghurs for Sale identified at least 80,000 Uyghurs transferred out of Xinjiang between 2017 and 2019 into factories in the supply chains of 83 well-known global brands, working under conditions the authors argued strongly suggested coercion.12 Perhaps you prefer to buy from a small domestic manufacturer over a shell brand whose margin flows out of the country. Perhaps you'd rather your children's toys come from a jurisdiction with a functional consumer-safety regulator. Perhaps, on any given day, you have none of those preferences and simply want a cheap dress. All of those choices are legitimate.

What is not legitimate — not on the part of shoppers, but on the part of a marketplace — is a design in which the information required to make the choice is out of reach. There is nothing radical about labels. The organic seal, the fair-trade certification, the dolphin-safe tuna icon, the "Product of…" line on a wine bottle: each of those was, at some point, an obscure activist demand that became a normal part of a shelf. Country-of-origin and beneficial-owner transparency for online goods is the same argument, extended to the store where most consumer purchases now happen. It is consumer sovereignty applied consistently.

We do not tell you what to buy. We show you the four things a typical listing quietly leaves out — where it's made, where it ships from, who the retailer really is, and where the money ultimately goes — with a confidence band and a source list. What you do with that is your business.

Every purchase is a vote A five-node flow showing consumer money moving from shopper to retailer to brand to parent company to country of beneficial ownership. You Retailer Brand Parent Country Every purchase is a vote. Where does yours land?
Follow the money. Four indicators trace the path a purchase actually takes — retailer of record, brand, parent company, country of beneficial ownership.

The method · AI + real sources

Why an AI-assisted approach — done carefully — is the right tool here

Thousands of retailers × millions of SKUs × brand-ownership chains that shift monthly = impossible to hand-maintain. Not doable by a small team with a spreadsheet. Doable, honestly, by a frontier AI reading each product page and reasoning over structured evidence — as long as it's forced to cite what it saw.

Read the full argument

The scale of the problem eliminates most of the obvious solutions. A team of researchers hand-maintaining a database of every SKU on Amazon would need to update it faster than Amazon adds new listings — and the answer for a given SKU can change quarterly (brand acquired, factory relocated, new marketplace seller). Regulators are moving on transparency (see the FTC's 2024 review of Made-in-USA claims and the EU's Digital Product Passport rollout), but consumer-facing labels for online goods are, in 2026, still not required at point-of-sale in the way food labels are.

What has changed in the last two years is that a frontier-tier AI model — the same class of system that reads legal briefs, medical literature, and technical filings — can now read a product page in full, weigh it against structured evidence (trademark filings, customs records, brand websites, corporate registries), and produce a country-and-confidence answer for each of the four indicators. That's real work an AI can do well. It's why the tool exists at all.

Which model, specifically. We use Claude (Anthropic's frontier model). Claude reads every product page, ranks the evidence, and writes the score. Two design decisions keep the AI honest:

  • Every claim cites a source. Claude is required to name the specific evidence it relied on for each indicator — the specs table entry, the seller's registered address, the customs record. If it can't cite, it can't score. The score card links every citation to the real source so you can check the AI's homework.
  • World knowledge is committed before the model sees the paperwork. Before Claude reads any structured evidence about a brand, we ask it to write down what it already knows — "Bosch is German," "TCL is Chinese," "Hydro Flask is American." That protects against paper trails: a Chinese seller registering "BRAND INC" in Delaware would otherwise fool a naive trademark lookup into reporting "United States." When world knowledge and paperwork disagree, world knowledge wins.

Honest limits: AI is one input, not the entire pipeline. Confirmed human corrections override AI scores. Every source we consult (USPTO trademark index, WHOIS registry, customs records, seller storefronts, brand websites, cross-ASIN priors) is a real database or a real page — the AI orchestrates and reasons; the evidence is not invented. When evidence is thin, the confidence percentage tells you so, and the answer can be "Not specified" rather than a guess. Every score is our best evaluative inference from the disclosed evidence, not a factual assertion.

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Chrome and Brave (Edge and Firefox coming soon). Free for the first 20 product checks, one time; plans from $4.99/mo. No tracking, no ads, sources cited on every claim.


Sources

  1. Consumer Federation of America, analysis of 2024 CPSC safety warnings (2025); U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Common E-Commerce Safety Violations and E-Commerce Assessment Report.

    Used for: the growth from 3 unilateral CPSC warnings in 2020 to 64 in 2024; the country and channel breakdown; the de minimis parcel-volume figures. CFA release · CPSC assessment.

  2. OECD / EUIPO, Global Trade in Fakes (2021 report; 2025 update).

    Used for: USD 464 billion in 2019 and USD 467 billion in 2021 counterfeit-trade totals; the 2.3% share of world imports. 2021 report (PDF) · 2025 update release.

  3. Frontier Economics for INTA and ICC-BASCAP, The Economic Impacts of Counterfeiting and Piracy (2017).

    Used for: the projected USD 2.8 trillion global counterfeit-and-piracy total once digital and services share is included. INTA summary.

  4. Amazon, Brand Protection Report 2023.

    Used for: the USD 1.2 billion investment; 15,000+ brand-protection staff; 7 million counterfeit units destroyed; 700,000 bad-actor account creations blocked. Amazon summary.

  5. Autor, D., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. (2013). "The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States." American Economic Review, 103(6): 2121–68.

    Used for: the ~25% share of the aggregate U.S. manufacturing-employment decline attributable to Chinese import competition, 1990–2007. AER page.

  6. Autor, D., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. (2016). "The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade." Annual Review of Economics, 8: 205–40.

    Used for: the finding that local labour-market adjustment is "remarkably slow," with wages and participation depressed a full decade after the shock. Annual Reviews · Author PDF.

  7. Autor, D., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. (2021). "On the Persistence of the China Shock." NBER Working Paper 29401; also in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2021.

    Used for: the finding that adverse effects on manufacturing employment and income persist through 2019. NBER page.

  8. CSIS, "Made in China 2025" analysis; U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Made in China 2025: Evaluating China's Performance.

    Used for: the ten priority sectors of the MIC 2025 policy and its measured progress against its own targets. CSIS overview · USCC report.

  9. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Section 301 Investigation Report (March 2018) and update (November 2018).

    Used for: the documented pattern of forced technology transfer, discriminatory licensing, state-directed acquisition of foreign firms, and cyber-enabled trade-secret theft. USTR investigation page · Nov 2018 update (PDF).

  10. Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, The IP Commission Report (2013) and Update (2017), National Bureau of Asian Research.

    Used for: the USD 225 billion to USD 600 billion annual-cost estimate for U.S. losses to IP theft. 2017 update (PDF).

  11. Spalding, R. Stealth War: How China Took Over While America's Elite Slept (Penguin, 2019); War Without Rules: China's Playbook for Global Domination (Penguin, 2022).

    Used for: the framing of Chinese economic expansion as coordinated national strategy rather than ordinary market competition. Stealth War · War Without Rules.

  12. Xu, V. X., Cave, D., Leibold, J., Munro, K., & Ruser, N. (2020). Uyghurs for Sale: "Re-education", forced labour and surveillance beyond Xinjiang. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Policy Brief Report No. 26/2020.

    Used for: the estimate of at least 80,000 Uyghurs transferred to factories outside Xinjiang between 2017 and 2019, and the count of 83 global brands with implicated supply chains. ASPI report page.

If you spot a factual error on this page, please tell us. We correct in public.